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Attack on St. Augustine by Oglethorpe - 1722 - 1762. The settlement of the new colony of Georgia, in 1732, increased the strength of the English settlements, and interposed another barrier between the Indians and Spaniards of Florida and the colonists of Carolina. The Altamaha was claimed as the southern boundary of the new colony, and a settlement of Scotch Highlanders was planted on the banks of that river. A fort was also built at Frederica, to command the approach to the settlements on St. Simon's Island. In the year 1736, the Spanish government, looking upon the settlement of Georgia as an encroachment upon their limits, sent a commissioner to Oglethorpe requiring him at once to surrender and evacuate all the territories south of St. Helena's Sound, as they belonged to the King of Spain, who was determined not to allow of their occupation by any other nation. Oglethorpe maintained the right of the English crown to all the territory occupied by him, and declined to comply with the requirements of the Spanish governor. From the imperious nature of the demand, Oglethorpe rightly conjectured that he might expect an armed invasion of his territory, and proceeded at once to England to direct the attention of the crown to the dangers that menaced the infant colony. English commerce had already suffered severely from the interference of Spain, and a feeling of hostility to the Spanish pretensions occupied the public mind. Supported by the king, and aided by popular sentiment, Oglethorpe was able to make strong preparations for the protection of Georgia against the anticipated attack. He returned in 1739, with the commission of major-general, a regiment of soldiers, and considerable pecuniary aid, and proceeded to erect forts on the coast and put the province in a state of defense. The Spanish force at St. Augustine was also strengthened, and both parties labored assiduously to prepare themselves, or the impending conflict by securing the alliance of the Indian tribes of the adjacent regions. Of these tribes the Creeks were the most powerful, and they took the British side of the dispute. Negotiations were meanwhile pending between the two governments. The English demanded redress for the injuries inflicted on their commerce, for which the Spaniards agreed to award compensation, provided the lands occupied by Oglethorpe were given up to them. This was refused, and the negotiations failed. The Spaniards at St. Augustine sent emissaries to the borders of Carolina to entice away the Negroes, promising them freedom and protection. Many Negroes had gone to them from time to time, a sufficient number, it was said, to enable the Spaniards to form a regiment, with officers of their own, placed on the same footing, as to pay and uniform, as the Spanish regulars. In October, 1739, war was declared by Great Britain against Spain, and a squadron was sent to the West Indies to cooperate with General Oglethorpe in his intended operations against the Spanish provinces in Florida. Oglethorpe at once set on foot an expedition to operate against St. Augustine, and visited South Carolina to engage assistance from that colony, which was readily given, and a joint expedition, to operate by land and sea, was agreed upon. A regiment of four hundred men was raised in Carolina, under Colonel Vanderdussen. The assistance of several Indian tribes was sought, and a naval force, to consist of four twenty gun ships and two sloops, was to take part in the attack. Oglethorpe had ascertained that the garrison at St. Augustine was not very formidable in point of numbers, and was poorly provisioned, and therefore urged forward his preparations with great vigor, in order to make his attack before they could be reinforced. The expedition was not ready to march, however, before the latter part of April, 1740. In the mean time, the energetic governor of Florida, Don Manuel de Monteano, was making every preparation to strengthen his defenses against the menaced attack of Oglethorpe. The garrison was increased, the approaches to the fort were guarded, and the most urgent solicitations made for a supply of provisions from Cuba. There were at this time several outposts, where a few soldiers, under sub-officers, were stationed. One of these was on Cumberland Island, but was withdrawn on account of its distance and isolation. Another fort, called St. Nicolas, was on the St. John's River, a few miles above its mouth. At Picolata there were two forts: the larger, on the west bank of the river, and called Poppa, (1) was garrisoned by sixty men; the other, at Picolata, had only ten men. These forts were designed to keep in check the Indians, and to protect the passage of detachments marching from St. Augustine to Apalachee. An attack had been made upon Fort Poppa by a party from the English settlement, in December, which had proved unsuccessful. In January, however, the fort at Picolata was taken, and Oglethorpe seemed to expect that the garrison at St. Augustine, being short of provisions, would become dissatisfied and desert in large numbers to him, while the rest, when driven into their castle and bombarded, would speedily surrender . (2) The vessels that composed the English squadron were the Flamborough, Captain Pearce, the Squirrel, Captain Warren, the Phoenix, Captain Fanshaw, and the Tartar, Captain Townshend, each of twenty guns. The force Oglethorpe had at his command in Georgia consisted of a regiment of regulars just arrived from England, a company of Scotch Highlanders from the Altamaha, under Captain Mcintosh, and an inconsiderable body of Indians. The place of rendezvous appointed for the land-forces was the mouth of the St. John's River. Oglethorpe felt the necessity of proceeding with the utmost energy ; but, as is usual with such expeditions, made up of contingent forces and without regular military organization and discipline, there were delays, so that it was late in May the 24th before the land-forces reached the mouth of the river, about forty miles from St. Augustine. About midway stood a fort, called San Diego, garrisoned by a few men, who fell back to St. Augustine and left the fort in the hands of Oglethorpe's party. On the 1st of June they reached a small fort, called Fort Moosa, about two miles north of St Augustine, and generally called The Negro Fort, it having been constructed for the fugitive slaves from South Carolina, and used by them as a place of security. This fort is described as being about twenty miles from Fort Diego, and within two miles distance and in full sight of the castle of St. Augustine, and situated near the creek which runs between Point Cartel and the castle up to Fort Diego. Fort Moosa was built in the middle of a plantation, to protect the Negroes from the Indians. It was square, with a flanker in each corner, banked around with earth, having a ditch without on all sides lined with prickly palmetto royal, and contained a house, a well, and a lookout. The English found this fort deserted, and, for some reason, concluding to destroy it, the gate and the house within the fort were burnt, and two breaches made in the ramparts, probably with the view of preventing its reoccupation by the enemy. Afterwards, concluding to garrison it. Colonel Palmer was sent there with one hundred and thirty three men, consisting of Mcintosh's Highlanders and some infantry, forty mounted men, and thirty-five Indians. Palmer protested against remaining with so small a force. (3) Lieutenant Bryant was sent out to obtain information, and, returning, reported the town to be in great confusion, the inhabitants "screeching and crying," and recommended an immediate attack. Oglethorpe then made a reconnaissance in person, and, concluding that he would not be justified in( exposing his men in so hazardous an attempt, determined to fall back to Fort Diego until joined by the remainder of his forces. It was not until the 6th of June that Colonel Vanderdussen arrived with his Carolina regiment, marching along the sea-beach to Point Cartel, and about the same time the fleet took position, and the siege was formally begun on the 20th of June. On the 24th of June the English opened fire upon the town and castle from three batteries which they had erected on Anastasia Island. One of these batteries was on the point of the island opposite the fort, and consisted of five pieces, four eighteen-pounders and one nine- pounder; another battery was on the margin of some high-wooded ground on the same island, and consisted of two eighteen-pounders; the third battery was on the north beach, on North River Point, called San Mateo, and had seven pieces, six of which were of iron and one of bronze. The mortars and "mortarets" were thirty-four in number, two of large size, two medium, and thirty of small caliber. (4) On Sunday night, the 25th of June, (5) a force of three hundred men attacked Fort Moosa, then held by Colonel Palmer (who, it will be remembered, had remonstrated against being left there with so small a garrison). There had been much dissatisfaction from the first among the officers. Colonel Palmer believed the fort to be untenable, and desired his officers to go out and scout about the country which they declined doing. There was some difficulty, too, about the command, between Colonel Palmer and Captains Mcintosh and McKay, and this led to insubordination, and the garrison was not in condition to make as firm a resistance as would have been otherwise maintained and as might have proved effectual. As it was, they were taken by surprise and overcome. As there was at that time much discussion and recrimination in reference to this matter, it may be as well to insert, verbatim, the account of one of the party engaged in the affair, as given before an investigating committee of the Carolina House of Assembly. The account is as follows: "On the 15th of June, about ten o'clock p.m., one of my rangers reported he had heard the Indian war-dance. Thereupon Colonel Palmer said we might expect a brush before day, and ordered the men to lie down and take a nap, and he would awake them by three or four o'clock. Accordingly he did so, and all the rangers got up immediately and stood to their arms. Then the colonel went into the fort and aroused the garrison, and, telling them the danger they were in, urged them to stand to their arms. But, as usual, not regarding him, they all lay down again. This put him into a great passion, and, coming out, he said he did not know what they trusted to, that the Spaniards would surely attack them after the Indian manner, and repeated that the general had sent them there to be sacrificed. He stood for some time after in the gateway, talking with one Jones. On a sudden one of the sentinels called out that there was a party of men coming. Colonel Palmer called out aloud, ' Stand to your arms not a man of you fire; receive their first fire, then half of you fire and fall back, making room for the rest to come up, and we will kill them like dogs.' Some of the Highlanders, then upon guard in the bastions, fired notwithstanding. Directly the enemy poured in a large volley, upon which the colonel said, 'Are these the men I have to trust to ? I thought so before,' and betook himself to the ditch. The rangers, who were about twelve yards without, followed the colonel as he had before directed them, because they would be in as much danger from the fire of the Highlanders within the fort as from the enemy without. Jones ran into the fort and got all the Indians together in one flanker, there being great hurry and confusion among the men, some being dressed and some undressed. Jones went into every flanker three times, yet could not find Captain Mcintosh or see anything of the soldiers. He found Captain McKay in one of them, just got up, in his shirt, with a small-sword and a musket. Jones advised Captain McKay to support the gate with the Highlanders, but to no purpose. In the mean time the enemy, attacking in different parties, particularly endeavored to force their way into the fort through the gate. But it was so well defended during a constant fire on all sides for a quarter of an hour, from the two flankers that commanded that side, and by Colonel Palmer, who kept forming and encouraging his men, that they were repulsed twice. At length they came on again, sword in hand, and entered the gate, being led by an officer whom Jones shot at his entrance. At the same time another party entered at one of the breaches, and soon the fort was full of Spaniards, it being now about half an hour before day. McKay immediately jumped over into the ditch, sword in hand, and advised all to shift for themselves. Soon after Mcintosh was carried out, a prisoner. They continued some time longer at club-work, cutting and slashing as fast as they could, until, the Spaniards being evidently masters, all that were able jumped into the ditch and made their way off through the enemy that surrounded the fort. Among these were Jones and six Indians, who on their way were joined by Colonel Palmer's two sons, the captain and his brother, and one of the rangers, who all together kept firing as they marched, and so, opening a way for themselves, escaped, Captain Palmer in particular killing a Spanish Indian. All this time Colonel Palmer maintained the ditch, with only two of his company by his side. At last he was shot from within the fort, and, bleeding very much inwardly from the mouth, he yet loaded his gun, and, when almost gone, reeling and panting, he cried out as he fell, ' Huzza, my boys ! the day is ours ! I have been in many a battle, and never lost one yet!' " Others escaped to Point Cartel by the creek. Fifty whites and Indians were killed, and twenty prisoners were taken. Colonel Palmer was the only Carolinian killed. The enemy's force consisted of three hundred forzadas (convicts) and Negroes. They lost two officers, including their commander, and had as many killed as the English. (6) Governor Monteano says that the attack on Fort Moosa was made with three hundred men, at eleven o'clock at night, with such impetuosity that sixty-eight of the English were left dead on the field and thirty-four were taken prisoners. The English force was stated by prisoners to be from one hundred and forty to one hundred and seventy, of whom thirty-five were Indians, Ychies and Uchies, commanded by a white chief. That an Indian reported he saw the body of Colonel Palmer, headless. Monteano acknowledges the loss of Lieutenant Don Jose de Aguilar and nine soldiers, and says his forces destroyed the fort and buried the dead. It appears pretty clearly, from the accounts on both sides, that, although not actually surprised, the greater part of Palmer's forces were entirely unprepared and had made no preparations for a successful resistance. The number of killed would show that there was a somewhat desperate hand-to-hand conflict, and from Colonel Palmer's remark it would appear that many of the English suffered from the misdirected aim of their comrades in the fort. Disorganization and want of discipline, and the lack of unity in the counsels at Fort Moosa, led to the natural result. The success of the Spaniards greatly encouraged them to make strenuous efforts for the defense of the castle, while the besiegers became depressed and anxious, and were daily suffering from the effects of the midsummer heat in this exposed position, where, too, they were annoyed by swarms of insects, from which they could invent no protection. Oglethorpe, however, proceeded with his offensive operations, and, having completed his first battery, on the 19th of June formally summoned the Spanish garrison to surrender. On the following day. Governor Monteano returned his answer, in which he '' swore by the Holy Cross that he would defend the castle to the last drop of his blood, and hoped soon to kiss his Excellencie's hand within its walls." It is said, however, on English authority, that the majority of the people of St. Augustine were in favor of a surrender, on condition that they should be permitted to go to Havana; but the governor and bishop, who, it is said, had come to a knowledge of the time our men-of- war intended to stay, would not consent. (7) This statement refers to a determination made by the commander of the fleet, and communicated to General Oglethorpe on the 6th of June, that he should deem it unsafe to remain on the coast later than the 5th of July, and which communication may have reached the ears of the Spanish government through deserters, (8) or through prisoners captured at Fort Moosa. A few days afterwards, some Chickasaw Indians brought into camp the head of a Spanish Indian, and presented it as a trophy to General Oglethorpe, who, wholly unaccustomed to the barbarities of savage warfare, spurned the offering and called the Indians barbarous dogs. This surprised and greatly exasperated them, and they soon after deserted. The batteries continued to play upon the town and fort, but with indifferent success, owing to the short range of the guns and the want of precision in handling them, but still more to the peculiar nature of the material of which the castle was built ; being constructed of a stone formed by the aggregation of small shells, thoroughly compacted, soft and yielding in appearance, but offering very much the same resistance to cannon- shot as that of moss or cotton on the face of a sand battery. The balls penetrated the stone to about their own depth, but made no fracture. Probably a continuous battering with modern rifled cannon might have cut through these walls and brought them down; but with such guns as were then used the castle was impregnable. The English claimed that all the shells fired except three broke either in the town or castle; but Monteano, in a report to the governor of Cuba, says that up to the 6th of July, although one hundred and fifty-three shells had fallen, his garrison and people had received no injury. Oglethorpe knew that the Spaniards were short of provisions, and vigilantly guarded the entrances to St. Augustine by the main bar and Matanzas Inlet, but neglected to blockade a port some sixty miles south, at Mosquito. This port communicated by tide-water within a few miles of the head of the Matanzas River, so that vessels might unload their cargoes at Mosquito, to be transshipped, by small boats to the intervening haul-over, and thence again to St. Augustine. It seems a little singular that in this fruitful country the people should have been so entirely dependent upon supplies furnished from abroad ; but this was the case with all of the early settlers; and had Oglethorpe effectually blockaded Mosquito, or placed a vessel inside Matanzas River to cut off that communication, the Spanish garrison would soon have been reduced by starvation, for the tenor of Monteano' s letters to his superior in Cuba was, '' Provisions, or I starve." The communication with Cuba was kept up by way of Apalachee, and also by canoes sent to the Florida Keys, there to connect by fishing-smacks with Cuba. The Spaniards had within the harbor some half-galleys, upon which they had mounted a few guns, and from time to time greatly annoyed the English by threatening a night- attack, so that they were kept in a continual state of anxiety. On the 1st of July there were fifty reported sick in the English camp, and Captain Wright, with the South Carolina volunteers, determined to return home. About this time, also, several deserters went over to the Spaniards, among them an Irishman, (8) and a man from New England, who reported to Monteano the condition of things in Oglethorpe's garrison. The latter had learned the inefficiency of his batteries, but still hoped to reduce the castle by starvation, until on the 27th of June he was informed by the captain of the vessel which lay off Matanzas Inlet that he had seen lying at Mosquito Bar a large sloop, two schooners, and some launches. Monteano says that on the 7th of July he received intelligence, through Luis Gomez, that vessels had arrived at Mosquito bringing him supplies; so it seems that, allowing for the difference in computation of time between the English and Spaniards, Monteano and Oglethorpe must have been informed about the same time of the arrival of the vessels which brought to the former confidence and relief and to the latter discouragement. On the same day the commander of the fleet informed Oglethorpe that, as the easterly winds were coming in, he felt obliged to ship his anchors and stand off. Oglethorpe seems to have then concluded to make a night-assault upon St. Augustine, as a deserter informed Monteano of the intention of the English to attack him during one of the dark nights that were approaching. In the mean time, the supply-vessels were safely discharged at Mosquito, and the transshipment by the inland route was commenced and carried on securely, until rendered unnecessary by the removal of the English ships, which made it safe for small vessels to enter at Matanzas Inlet. On the 3rd of July Colonel Vanderdussen's scouts on Anastasia Island discovered launches coming up Matanzas River, and he there- upon went with a detachment to the narrows, hoping to cut off the passage of the launches, but was driven off by the armed galleys that now guarded the river. The next day the question of abandoning the siege was discussed by the English commanders, and Colonel Vanderdussen, it is said, was opposed to withdrawing. But Oglethorpe felt that the force at his command was wholly inadequate for prosecuting the siege. Many of his men were sick, the fleet had withdrawn, and, the Spanish garrison having received supplies, there was no longer a hope of reducing them by starvation. It was therefore decided to raise the siege and abandon the enterprise for the present. On the 7th of July most of the guns from the batteries were placed on board the ships, which crossed the bar and went out on the 9th. Three six-pounders were buried in the sand at Point Cartel, and one eighteen-pounder at the battery nearest the fort. The amount of stores destroyed did not probably exceed one hundred pounds in value. It is said that "the soldiers were loath to part with the liquor, and drank very freely of it." The troops marched on the loth, with banners flying and drums beating, but were unable to provoke an attack from the Spaniards, Monteano doubtless thinking that "prudence was the better part of valor." The loss at Moosa was the only serious one sustained by the English in battle. The Carolina regiment lost but eight men by sickness, four by accident, and two by desertion to the enemy. The small number of deaths speaks well for the healthiness of their encampment on Anastasia Island. But the siege was undertaken too late in the season, when there was much unavoidable suffering from the heat and insects, sand-flies and mosquitoes, which must of course have interfered seriously with the efficiency of Oglethorpe's small command. Had he arrived sixty days earlier, he might have accomplished more than he did ; but it is hardly to be supposed that, with his small numbers and insufficient siege-guns, he could at any season have reduced the castle at St. Augustine, fortified as it was with all the equipments known to the military engineers of that day. The shallowness of the water on the bar prevented the entrance of the English ships to participate in the attack, while the armed galleys of the Spaniards effectually protected the town from assault by small boats. St. Augustine is situated upon a narrow peninsula formed by the Sebastian and Matanzas Rivers, the waters of which are connected by a ditch at the north end of the town, where the fort stands. Palisades and batteries defended the only open side of the town, in front of which a space of fifteen hundred yards was kept clear of all obstructions, so that in order to attack the town from the land-approaches the enemy would have to pass over this open space under fire from the fort, batteries, and earthworks that protected it. If the town itself had been taken, the castle could have sustained a siege, unless forced to surrender for want of provisions. Had Oglethorpe effectually blockaded the ports, including Mosquito Inlet, or had he cut off inland communication with Matanzas River, it would have been almost impossible for Monteano to obtain supplies; but these avenues of communication with the Spanish garrison seem not to have been known or clearly understood by the English commander. The failure of his expedition created great dissatisfaction in Carolina, and, as usual, recriminations were indulged in; disputes arose between the South Carolina and Georgia partisans, each endeavoring to throw the entire responsibility of the failure upon the other. The disputes were never settled satisfactorily, and criticisms have extended down even to our own time; but the conclusion arrived at by those who have thoroughly examined the matter seems to be, that no blame could be attached to either party, and that the want of success was owing to circumstances over which neither the commander nor his troops had any control. The season was certainly most unfavorable, and the force placed at the control of Oglethorpe was felt by him to be insufficient; but the urgency of the case seemed to admit of no delay, and doubtless, had the attempt not been made, greater dissatisfaction would have been felt than was created by the failure of the expedition. It has been supposed that a discrepancy existed in the English and Spanish reports as to the date at which supplies arrived from Cuba; but this is satisfactorily reconciled by observing that the computation in the Spanish accounts was made according to the New Style, and that in the English by the Old Style. Monteano was informed by deserters that it was the purpose of Oglethorpe to return in the winter or spring with a larger force; and he accordingly labored with great diligence to strengthen his position, and urged upon the governor of Cuba the necessity of sending him strong reinforcements. The castle had sustained no material injury in the late bombardment, as its walls now, after a lapse of more than one hundred years, attest; but more men were needed, for, according to Monteano's statement, he had a nominal force of seven hundred and fifty men, and of these only three hundred and fifty-six could be relied on for active duty. He asked for three hundred and ninety-four to make up the complement of the garrison, and three hundred more to strengthen it against the return of Oglethorpe; (9) these three hundred to be "men of arms, mulattoes and free Negroes," to be sent out immediately, the regulars and artillery not later than the ensuing December. (10) He urged constantly upon the governor of Cuba the necessity of sending him reinforcements to meet the apprehended attack of the English; and it undoubtedly was the intention of Oglethorpe to return to St. Augustine whenever he had such force as experience had proved to be necessary. Eight companies of infantry were sent to Monteano; and in the following spring, finding the attention of the English apparently withdrawn from further offensive operations, he advised the invasion of South Carolina and Georgia. A destructive fire had occurred in Charleston, consuming three hundred of the best buildings in the place and, the province being greatly depressed by the heavy indebtedness in which the expedition to Florida had involved her, Monteano thought that the misfortunes of his neighbors invited an invasion of their province with the greater promise of success. He hoped to strike them with terror by an attack which would threaten them with an insurrection of their slaves, and which, by the destruction of their city and some of their plantations, would create consternation, and perhaps cause the flight of many. The proposition of Monteano does not appear to have been acted on immediately, and the year 1741 passed away without active operations on either side. Preparations were, however, made by the Spaniards with the view of invading the English colonies with a large force in the following spring. Early in the spring of 1742, the governor of Cuba dispatched an expedition designed to operate against the settlements in Georgia. It consisted of some two thousand men, and went first to St. Augustine, where great delay occurred, from the difficulty of organizing that portion of the expedition that was to be formed from the garrison at that place. In the mean time, Oglethorpe was apprised of the proximity of the Spanish fleet. He at once called to his aid the friendly Indians attached to his service, and sent a message to Carolina, urging prompt assistance. No effort was spared to strengthen his position and to use to the best advantage his very limited means, and, without professional engineers, he went to work to construct batteries to command the approach to St. Simon's Island. The Spanish fleet, consisting of thirty-six sail, received at St. Augustine an additional force of one thousand men, and was placed under the command of Governor Monteano. On the 5th of July, 1742, he entered the harbor of St. Simon's, where he met with strong resistance from Oglethorpe, who had mounted guns on two vessels in the harbor, and kept up a steady fire from these and his batteries on the shore. After four hours' engagement, Monteano succeeded in passing these and getting beyond the range of the guns; whereupon Oglethorpe determined to abandon the works and retire to Frederica. Having destroyed the fort and batteries at St. Simon's, he succeeded in safely retreating to Frederica with several vessels, and there awaited the attack of Monteano. Two days later the Spanish general landed his troops and commenced his march. In order to reach Frederica he was obliged to pass over a narrow causeway through the marshes, and, while crossing this place, he was attacked, and sustained such heavy losses that he fell back to the cover of his camp, leaving many prisoners in the hands of the English. A few days afterwards the Spaniards attempted to ascend the river and attack Frederica Dy water, but they encountered such a warm reception that they again fell back. Oglethorpe learned that in the action at the causeway Monteano lost four captains and over two hundred men, and that a number had also been killed at the action with the batteries. The English general determined to avail himself of the evident discouragement prevailing in the Spanish camp, and by a night-attack add to their apprehension and dissatisfaction, and accordingly marched his forces to the neighborhood of the Spanish camp. But the desertion of a Frenchman, who betrayed his plans to the enemy, compelled him to abandon the attack. This apparently unfortunate incident was, however, used to good effect by the ready genius of Oglethorpe. Calling in one of his Spanish prisoners, he gave him a sum of money and promised him his liberty if he would carry a letter from him to the French deserter. This letter was in French, and purported to be written by a friend of the Frenchman, desiring him to persuade the Spaniards that the English forces were weak and could be easily overcome ; and he was then to induce them (the Spaniards), if possible, to allow him to pilot them up a safe passage to the English fort, but he was to bring them directly upon concealed batteries; and, if the plan was carried out faithfully, the Frenchman was to receive a liberal reward. When the Spaniard arrived in camp, he was carried immediately before the governor and questioned as to his escape and whether he had letters. He said he had none, but, upon being searched, the letter was found. The Frenchman denied knowing the writer of it or anything of its contents; but, on trial, he was condemned as a double spy, and so the object of Oglethorpe's intrigue was effected, in having awakened the distrust of the Spaniards towards the French deserter. Monteano was, however, greatly perplexed by the letter, and re-embarked his troops. Just at this critical time, three vessels, that had been sent from Charleston to aid Oglethorpe, appeared in sight, and Monteano, believing that the English would be heavily reinforced, determined to retire. An attack was made upon Fort William by a portion of the fleet, but was unsuccessful; whereupon the entire Spanish force retired to Cuba and St. Augustine, deeply chagrined at the failure of their enterprise. (10) There appears to have been a want of cordiality and co-operation between Oglethorpe and the Carolinians on this occasion, caused, it is said, by their distrust of the general's abilities as a military leader, the unfortunate expedition to St. Augustine being still fresh in their memories; but Oglethorpe's repulse of Monteano restored their confidence and established his reputation as one of the most distinguished colonial governors on this continent. In March of the next year, 1743, Oglethorpe made a sudden descent upon Florida, and marched to the gates of St. Augustine, offering battle, and the Indians attached to his force advanced with so much celerity that they captured and slew forty of the Spanish troops under the very walls of the fort where they were seeking shelter."(11) The Spaniards refusing to fight, Oglethorpe retired; and, though it was reported that troops were to be sent from Havana to destroy the English colonies, no further hostilities occurred, and comparative peace prevailed for many years, although the Indians in the Spanish interest continued to molest and ravage the English border settlements. The garrison at St. Augustine was greatly reduced after the necessity for defensive operations had ceased, and in 1759 Governor Palazir reports his command as only five hundred men in all on duty there. A treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Spain in the year 1748, which caused a suspension of hostilities between the colonies. The progress of French settlements in the West began to create uneasiness, as a conflict of interest threatened between the trading- houses of the three rival nations. Upon the renewal of hostilities between Spain and Great Britain, in 1762, Havana fell into the hands of the English, which at once isolated St. Augustine from its home government and sources of supply. England had long desired to complete her colonial boundaries by the acquisition of Florida, and the capture of Havana seemed to offer a favorable opportunity, by arranging for its transfer to Spain in exchange for Florida. This was effected in concluding the treaty between England, France, and Spain, November 3, 1762, and ratified on the 10th of February, 1763. By this treaty, the provinces of East and West Florida were ceded to Great Britain, and Cuba was restored to Spain.
(1) The remains of Fort Poppa are still visible, near the ferry-house on the west bank of the St. John's River, opposite Picolata. (2) Report of Com. S. C, p. 430. (3) MS. Report of Expedition to St. Augustine, S. C, p. 437. (4) Monteano MS. Dispatch, No. 205. (5) The English account says 15th June. The discrepancy may arise from the difference in computation, Old Style and New Style. (6) Captain Mcintosh, in a letter written while he was a prisoner in Spain, says, " Seven hundred Spaniards sallied out to attack us. They did not surprise us, but put on with numbers. Twenty were taken prisoners, a few got off; the rest killed. The Spaniards lost three hundred killed on the spot, besides wounded." MS. in Ga. Hist. Soc. Library ; Fairbanks' s Hist. St. Augustine, p. 147. (7) Report of Com. S. C. House of Assembly, pp. 453-4- Monteano says a deserter came over on the 14th of June. (8) Bayley, an Irishman, deserted, but was caught by a negro, tried by court-martial, and shot. - S. C, Rep. (9) Monteano MS., Carta de 7 Agosto, 1740. (10) General Oglethorpe's letter to the Duke of Newcastle, July 30, 1741. (11) General Oglethorpe's letter, 21st March, 1743. ©Genealogy Trails |
