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Brantley County, Georgia
Train Accident
Nov. 28, 1923

Rear-end collision between an Atlantic Coast Line train and a Southern Railway passenger train at Nahunta, Ga., on November 28, 1923, which resulted in the death of 1 employee and the injury of 81 passengers, 17 persons carried under contract, and 2 employees.

This accident was caused by the failure of the conductor and flagman of the Atlantic Coast Line train to provide proper protection for their train.

There are two routes between Folkstone and Jesup, which are intermediate stations on the district on which this accident occurred; that via Nahunta being known as the Jesup short line. At Nahunta the Jesup short line, which runs almost north and south, is crossed by the Brunswick-Waycross Branch, both being single-track lines, with wye connections both north and south of the crossing. The accident occurred on the Jesup short line at a point about 100 feet north of the switch leading to the north leg of the wye, which switch is 1,014 feet north of the station.

The Jesup short line is tangent in either direction for several miles, while the grade is practically level. There is no block-signal system in use, trains on the Jesup short line being operated by timetable and train orders. At Nahunta there is a mechanical interlocking plant which is used to govern crossing movements only, all of the switches being hand operated and all of the functions of the interlocking plant being mechanically operated. The northbound home and distant signals are located 350 and 2,150 feet, respectively, south of the crossing. The station is located in the northeast angle of the intersection; the train-order board is located at the station, and its normal position is clear.

The weather was cloudy at the time of the accident, which occurred at about 10.36 p. m.

Northbound Atlantic Coast Line passenger train extra 464, which ordinarily is operated as train No. 32 between Jacksonville and Waycross, was being detoured via Nahunta and thence on the Brunswick-Waycross branch to Waycross. It consisted of four express cars, one baggage car, two coaches, one dining car, and six Pullman sleeping care, in the order named, hauled by engine 464. At Folkston train order No. 82, Form 31, was received reading as follows:

Engs 464, 358, 469 run extra Folkston to Nahunta with right over all trains south run ahead of 1st class trains make first class speed.

Extra 464 left Folkston at 9.47 p. m., 22 minutes late on the schedule of train No. 32, passed Winokur, 11.9 miles from Nahunta and the last open office, at 10.13 p. m., and according to the train sheet passed the station at Nahunta at 10.29 p. m. In order to make the movement from the main line to the Brunswick-Waycross branch, it was necessary to pull by the north wye switch, and then back through the north leg of the wye to the branch-line track. While the rear of extra 464 was either standing on the main line north of the switch, or being backed slowly toward this switch, it was struck by train No. 8.

Northbound Southern Railway passenger train No. 8 consisted of one mail car, one express car, two coaches, and four Pullman sleeping cars, in the order named, hauled by engine 1907. This train left Jacksonville directly behind extra 464, left Folkston at 10 p. m., passed Winokur at 10.21 p. m., eight minutes behind extra 464, and according to the operator at Nahunta, passed that station at 10.36 p. m., and collided with the rear of extra 464 while traveling at a speed of about 25 miles an hour.

The force of the collision derailed the forward truck and considerably damaged the rear end of the last car of extra 464 and slightly damaged three other cars. Engine 1907 was considerably damaged, but no material damage was sustained by any of the equipment of this train. The employee killed was the engineman of train No. 8.

While the investigation disclosed that there may have been some misunderstanding between the conductor and flagman as to the method which the conductor intended to be followed in protecting the movement of extra 464 from the main line to the wye, it is apparent that this movement was not protected as required by the rules. Rule 99(a) provides as follows:

When the speed of a train is reduced and its rear thereby endangered by a following train before the flagman can get off, a lighted fusee mast be thrown, upon the track at intervals until the flagman can get back to protect his train.

In this instance entire dependence was evidently placed upon a fusee which the flagman states was thrown off near the distant signal. The flagman and baggage-master of extra 464 were positive in their statements that a lighted fusee was thrown off at that point, and the conductor of extra 464 said train No. 8 ran over the lighted fuse* without acknowledging it; however, the fireman and conductor of train No. 8 were equally positive that there was no burning fusee on the track in that vicinity when that train approached, and their statements are supported by the statement of the operator that he saw no fusee as train No. 8 approached, as well as by the fact that the engineman of train No. 8 continued to operate his train at full speed beyond that point. It is believed that if the flagman of extra 464 threw off a fusee when approaching Nahunta, it was not burning when train No. 8 approached; both the conductor and flagman of extra 464 were in position to have full knowledge of this fact and knew that train No. 8 was following them, as it had been in sight for several miles, and there was ample time to have provided adequate protection. It was clearly the duty of the conductor to see that adequate flag protection was provided for his train while it was occupying the main track, and he said he told the flagman to perform this duty. The statements of the flagman, however, are to the effect that he was told to remain with his train, in which statement he is supported by the baggage-master. Regardless of which version is correct, the conductor was in position to know what was taking place and should have seen to it that his train was being properly protected.
[Source: "SUMMARY OF ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORTS, NO. 18, OCTOBER, NOVEMBER, AND DECEMBER, 1923, By United States Interstate Commerce Commission Bureau - Sub. by K. Torp]





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