(a) The occupation of Charlestown Heights
on the night of June 16, 1775, was of stragic
value, however
transient, equalizing the relations of the parties opposed and
projecting
its force and fire into the entire struggle for
American Independence (pp. 290-302)
(b) "The Siege of Boston, which followed,
gave the freshly organized Continental army that
discipline, that
instruction in military engineering, and that contact with a
well-trained
enemy which prepared it for immediate operations at
New York & New Jersey. (pp 37-44).
(c) The occupation and defence of New York
and Brooklyn, so promptly made, was also an
immediate strategic
necessity, fully warranted by the existing conditions, although
alike
temporary. (pp. 154-161).
An exhaustive theme may be so outlined that
fairly stated data will suggest the possibilities
beyond.
Waterloo is incidentally related to the
crowing laurels of Wellington; but, primarily, to the downfall of
Napoleon, while rarely to the assured growth of genuine popular
liberty.
No battle during the American Rebellion of
1861-1865 was so really decisive as was the first battle of Bull's
Run. As that Federal failure enforced the issue which freed
four millions of people from slavery, and had its sequence and
culmination, through great struggle, in a perpetuated Union, so did
the battle of Bunker Hill open wide the breach between Great Britain
and the Colonies, and render American Independence
inevitable.
The repulse of Howe at Breed's Hill
practically ejected him from Boston, enforced his halt before
Brooklyn, delayed him at White Plains, explained his hesitation at
Bound Brook, near Somerset Court House in 1777, as well
Insert
Battle of Bunker Hill - Map by Colonel Henry B.
Carrington
as his sluggishness after the battle of
Brandywine and equally induced his inaction at
Philadelphia in
1778.
Just as a similar resistance by Totleben at
Sevastapol during the Crimean War prolonged that struggle for twelve
months, so did the hastily constructed earthworks on Breed's
Hill
forewarn the assailants that every ridge might serve as a
fortress, and every sand-hill be-
come a cover for a persistent
and earnest foe.
Historical research and military criticism
suggest few cases where so much has been realized by the efforts of
a few men, in a few hours, during the shelter of one night,
and
by the light of one day.
The simple narrative has been the subject
of much discussion. Its details have been shaped
and
colored, with supreme regard for the special claims of preferred
candidates for distinction, until a plain consideration of the issue
then made, from a purely military point of view, as introductory to
a detail of the battle itself cannot be barren of interest to the
readers of a magazine which treats largely of the local history of
Massachusetts.
The city of Boston was girdled by rapidly
increasing earthworks. These were wholly defensive, to resist
assault from the British garrison, and not, at first, as cover for
a
regular siege approach against the Island Post. They soon
became a direct agency to force the garrison to look to the sea
alone for supplies or retreat.
Open war against Great Britain began with
this environment of Boston. The partially organized militia
responded promptly to call.
The vivifying force of the struggle through
Concord, Lexington and West Cambridge (now
Arlington) had so
quickened the rapidly augmenting body of patriots, that they
demanded
offensive action and grew impatient for results.
Having dropped fear of British troops,
as such, they held a
strong purpose to achieve that complete deliverance which their
earnest resistance foreshadowed.
Lexington and Concord were, therefore, the
exponents of that daring which made the occupation and resistance of
Breed's Hill possible. The fancied invincibility of
British
discipline went down before the rifles of farmers; but
the quickening sentiment, which gave nerve to the arm, steadiness to
the heart, and force to the blow, was one of those historic
expressions of human will and faith, which, under deep sense of
wrong, incurred and rights
imperelled, over masters discipline,
and has the method of an inspired madness. The moral force of
the energizing passion became overwhelming and supreme. No
troops in the world, under similar conditions, could have resisted
the movement.
The opposing forces did not alike estimate
the issue, or the relations of the parties in interest. The
troops sent forth to collect or destroy arms, rightfully in the
hands of their countrymen, and not to engage an enemy, were under an
involuntary restraint which stripped them of real fitness to meet
armed men, who were already on fire with the conviction that the
respresentatives of national force were employed to destroy national
life.
The ostensible theory of the Crown was to
reconcile the Colonies. The actual policy and its physical
demonstrations, repelled and did not conciliate. Military acts,
easily done by the force in hand, were needlessly done. Military
acts which would be wise upon the basis of anticipated resistance
were not done.
Threats and blows and blows toward those
not deemed capable of resistance were freely expended.
Operations of war, as against an orgainized and skilful enemy, were
ignored. But the legacies of English law and the inheritance
of English liberty had vested in the Colonies. Their
eradication and their withdrawal were alike impossible. The
time had passed for compromise or limitation of their
enjoyment. The filial relation toward England was lost when it
became that of a slave toward master, to be asserted by force.
This the American understood when they environed Boston. This
the British did not understand until
until after the battle of
Bunker Hill. The British worked as against a mob of rebels.
The
Americans made common cause, "liberty or death," against
usurpation and tyranny.
The
Outlook.
Rference to map "Boston and Vicinity," will
give a clear impression of the local surroundings at the time of the
American occupation of Charlestown Heights. The value
of
that position was to be tested. The Americans had previously
burned the lighthouses
of the harbor. The islands of the
bay were already miniature fields of conflict; and every
effort
of the garrison to use boats, and thereby secure the needed supplies
of beef, flour
or fuel, only developed a counter system of boat
operations, which neutralized the former and gradaully limited the
garrison to the range of its guns. This close grasp of the
land approaches to Boston, so persistently maintained, stimulated
the Americans tocatch a tighter hold, and force the garrison to
escape by sea. The capture of that garrison would
have
placed unwieldy prisoners in their hands and have made outside
operations impossible,
as well as any practical disposition of
the prisoners themselves, in treatment with Great
Britian.
Expulsion was the purpose of the rallying people.
General Gage fortified Boston Neck as early
as 1774, and the First Continental Congress had
promptly assured
Massachusetts of its sympathy with her solemn protest against that
act.
It was also the intention of General Gage to fortify
Dorchester Heights. Early in April, a
British council of
war, in which Clinton, Burgoyne, and Percy took part, unanimously
advised the immediate occupation of Dorchester, as both
indispensable to the protection of
the shipping and as assurance
of access to the country for indispensable supplies.
General Howe already appreciated the
mistake of General Gage, in his expedition to Concord,
but still
cherished such hope of an accommodation of the issue with the
Colonies that he postponed action until a peaceable occupation of
Dorchester Heights became impossible, and the growing earthworks of
the besiegers already commanded Boston Neck.
General Gage had also advised, and wisely,
the occupation of Charlestown Heights, as both
necessary and
feasible, without risk to Boston itself. He went so far as to
announce that,
in case of overt acts of hostility to such
occupation, by the citizens of Charlestown, he would burn the town.
It was clearly sound military policy for the British to occupy both
Dorchester and Charlestown Heights, at the first attempt of the
Americans to invest the city.
As early as the middle of May, the
Massachusetts Committee of Safety, as well as the council, had
resolved "to occupy Bunker Hill as soon as artillery and powder
could be ad-
equately furnished for the purpose." and a committee
was appointed to examine and report respectig the merits of
Dorchester Heights, as a strategic restraint upon the garrison
of
Boston.
On the fifteenth of June, upon reliable
informatin that the British had definitely resolved
to seize both
Heights, and had designated the eighteenth of June for the occupatin
of Charlestown, the same Committee of Safety voted "to take
immediate possession of Bunker Hill.:
Mr. Bancroft states that "the decision was
so sudden that no fit preparation could be made." Under the
existing conditions, it was indeed a desperate daring, expressive of
grand faith and self-devotion, worthy of the cause in peril, and
only limited in its immediate and assured triumph by the simple lack
of powder.
Col. William Prescott, who was eager to
lead the enterprise and was entrusted with its execution, and
Putnam, who gave it his most ardent support, wee most urgent that
the council should act promptly; while Joseph Warren who long
hesitated to concur, did at last
concur and gave his life as the
test of his devotion. General Ward realized fully that
the
hesitation of the British to emerge from Boston and attack
the Americans was an index of the security of the American defenses,
and, therefore, deprecated the contingency of a general engagement,
until ample supplies of powder could be secured.
The British garrison which had been
reinforced to a nominal strength of ten thousand men,
had become
reduced, through inadequate supplies, especially of fresh meat, to
eight thousand effectives, but these men were well officered and
well disciplined.
The Position.
Bunker Hill had an easy slope to the
isthmus, but was quite steep on either side, having,
in fact,
control of the isthmus, as well as commanding a full view of Boston
and the surrounding country. Morton's Hill at Moulton's Point,
where the British landed, was but thirty five feet above sea level,
seventy-five and one hundred and ten feet high. The Charles
and Mystic Rivers, which flanked Charlestown, were navigable, and
were under the control of British ships-of-war.
American Policy.
To so occupy Charlestown, in advance, as to
prevent a successful British landing, required the use of the
nearest available position that would make the light artillery of
the Americans effective. To occupy Bunker Hill, alone, would
leave to the British the cover of Breed's Hill, under which to gain
effective fire and a good base for approach, as well as Charlestown
for quarters, without prejudice to themselves.
When, therefore, Breed's Hill was fortified
as an advanced position, it was done with the assurance that
reinforcements would soon occupy the retired summit, and the cousr
adopted was the best to prevent an effective British lodgment.
The previous reluctance of the garrison to make any effective
demonstration against the thin lines of environment strengthened the
belief of the Americans that a well-selected hold upon Charlestown
Heights would securely tighten the graps upon the city
itself.
British Policy.
As a fact, the British contempt for the
Americans might have urged them as rashly against
Bunker Hill as
it did against the redoubt which they gained, at last, only through
failure of the ammunition of its defenders; but in view of the few
hourse at disposal of the Americans to prepare against a landing so
soon to be attempted, it is certain that the defences were well
placed, both to cover the town and force an immediate issue before
the British could increase their own force.
It is equally certain that the British
utterly failed to appreciate the fact that with the control of the
Mystic and Charles Rivers, they could within twenty four house, so
isolate Charlestown as to secure the same results as by storming the
American position and without appreciable loss. This was the
advice of General Clinton, but he was overruled. They did,
ultimately, thereby check reinforcements but suffered so severely in
the battle itself that fully two thirds of the Americans retired
safely to the main land.
The delay of the British to advance as soon
as the landing was effected was bad tactics. One half of the
force could have followed the Mystic and turned the American left
wing, long before Colonel Stark's command came upon the field.
The British dined as leisurely as if they had only to move any time
and seize the threatening position, and thereby lost their chief
opportunity.
One single sign of the recognition of any
possible risk to themselves was the opening of fire from Boston Neck
and such other positions as faced the American lines, as if to warn
them not to attempt the city or endanger their own lives by sending
reinforcements to Charlestown.
The Movement.
It is not the purpose of this article to
elaborate the details of preparation, which have been so fully
discussed by many writers, but to illustrate the value of the action
in the light of the relations and conduct of the opposing
forces.
Colonel William Prescott of Pepperell,
Mass., Colonel James Frye, of Andover and Colonel
Ebenezer Bridge
of Billerica whose regiments formed most of the original detail,
were
members of the council of war which had been organized on
the 20th of April when
General Ward assumed command of the
army. Colonel Thomas Knowlton of Putnam's
regiment, was to
lead a detachment from the Connecticut troops. Colonel Richard
Gridley,
chief engineer, with a company of artillery wa also
assigned to the moving columns.
To ensure a force of one thousand men, the
field order covered nearly fourteen hundred and Mr. Frothingham
shows clearly that the actual force as organized with artificers
and
drivers of carts was not less than twelve hundred
men.
Cambridge Common ws the place of
rendesvous, where, at early twilight of June 16th, the
Reverend
Samuel Langdon, president of Harvard College invoked the blessing of
Almighty
God upon the solemn undertaking.
This silent body of earnest men crossed
Charlestown Neck and halted for a clear definition
of the
impending duty. Major Brooks, of Colonel Dodge's regiment
joined here, as well
as a company of artillery. Captain
Nutting with a detachment of Connecticut men was
promptly sent,
by the quickest route to patrol Charlestown at the summit of Bunker
Hill.
Captain Maxwell's company of Prescott's
Regiment, was next detailed to patrol the shore
in silence and
keenly note any activity on board the British
men-of-war.
The six vessels lying in the stream were
the Somerset, sixty-eight, Captain Edward Le Cross; Cerberus,
thirty-six, Captain Chads; the Glasgow, thirty-four, Captain William
Maltby; the Lively, twenty, Capt. Thomas Bishop; the Falcon, twenty,
Captain Linzee; and the Symmetry, a transport, with eighteen
guns.
While one thousand men worked upon the
redoubt which had been located under counsel
of Gridley,
Prescott, Knowlton and other officers, the dull thud of the
pickaxe and the
grating of shovels were the only sounds that
disturbed the pervading silence, except as the
sentries' "All's
well!" from Copp's Hill and from the warships, relieved anxiety and
stimulated work. Prescott and Putnam alike, and more than
once, visited the beach, to be
assured that the seeming security
was real; and at daybreak the redoubt, nearly eight rods
square
and six feet high was nearly complete.
Scarcely had objects become distinct, when
the battery on Copp's Hill and the guns of the
ship, Lively,
opened fire, and startled the garrison of Boston from sleep, to a
certainty that the Colonists had taken the offensive.
General Putnam reached headquarters at a
very early hour and secured the detail of a
portion of Colonel
Stark's regiment, to reinforce the first detail which had already
occupied
the Hill.
At nine o'clock, a council of war was held
at Breed's Hill. Major John Brooks was sent
to ask for more
men and more rations. Richard Devens of the Committee of
Safety, then in
session, was influential in persuading General
Ward to furnish prompt reinforcements. By
eleven o'clock,
the whole of Stark's and Reed's New Hampshire regiments were on
their
march, and in time to meet the first shock of battle.
Portions of other regiments hastened
to the aid of those already
waiting for the fight to begin.
The details of men were not exactly
defined, in all cases, when the urgent call for reinforce-
ments
reached headquarters. Little's regiment of Essex men;
Brewer's, of Worcester and
Middlesex with their Lieutenant
Colonel Buckminster, Nixon's, led by Nixon, himself; Moore's from
Worcester; Whitcomb's of Lancaster and others promptly accepted
the
opportunity to take part in the offensive, and challenge the
British garrison to a contest
at arms, and well they bore their
part in the struggle.
The completion of the redoubt only made
more distinct the necessity for additional
defences. A
line of breastworks, a few rods in length, was carried to the left
and then to
the rear, in order to connect with a stone fence
which was accepted as a part of the line,
since the fence ran
perpendicularly to the Mystic River; and the intention was to
throw
some protection across the entire peninsula to the
river. A small pond and some spongy
ground were left open,
as non-essential, considering the value of every moment;
and
every exertion was made for the protection of the immediate
front. The stone fence, like those still common in New
England, was two or three feet high, with set posts and
two
rails; in all, about five feet high, the top rail giving a
rest for a rifle.
A zigzag "stake and rider fence" was put in
front, the meadow division-fences being stripped for the
purpose. The fresh-mown hay filled the interval between the
fences.
This line was nearly two hundred yards in rear of the
face of the redoubt, and near the
foot of Bunker Hill.
Captain Knowlton, with two pieces of
artillery and Connecticut troops, was assigned,
by Colonel
William Prescott, to the right of this position, adjoining the open
gap already
mentioned. Between the fence and the river,
more conspicuous as low tide, was a long gap
which was promptly
filled by Stark as soon as he reached the ground, thus, as far as
possi-
ble, to anticipate the very flanking movement which the
British afterward attempted.
Putnam ws everywhere active and, after the
fences were as well secured as time would allow,
he ordered the
tools taken to Bunker Hill for the establishment of a second line on
higher
ground in case the first could not be maintianed.
His importunity with General Ward had
secured the detail of the
whole of Reed?s, as well as the balance of Stark?s regiment, so that
the entire left was protected by New Hampshire troops. With
all their energy they were able to gather from the shore only stone
enough for partial cover, while they lay down or kneeled to the
fire.
The whole force thus spread out to meet the
British army was less than sixteen hundred men.
Six pieces of
artillery were in use at different times, but with little
effect. The cannon cartridges were at last distributed for the
rifles, and five of the guns were left on the field when retread
became inevitable.
Reference to the map will indicate the
position thus outlined. It was evident that the landing could
not be prevented. Succcessive barges landed the well-equipped
troops and they took their positions and their dinner, under the
blaze of the hot sun, as if nothing but ordinary duty was awaiting
their leisure.
It was nearly three o?clock in the
afternoon when the British army formed for the advance.
General
Howe was expected to break and envelop the American left wing, take
the redoubt in
the rear and cut off retreat to Bunker Hill and
the mainland. The light infantry moved closely along the
Mystic River. The grenadiers advanced upon the stone fence,
while the British left demonstrated toward the unprotected gap which
was between the fence and the short breastwork next the
redoubt. General Pigot with the extreme left wing moved
directly upon the redoubt.
The British artillery had been supplied
with twelve-pound shot for six-pounder guns, and thus disabled, were
ordered to use only grape. The guns were, therefore, advanced
to the edge of an old brick-kiln, as the spongy ground and heavy
grass did not permit ready handling of guns at the foot of the hill
slope, or even just at its left. This secured a more effective
range of fire upon the skeleton defences of the American centre, and
an eligible position for a direct fire upon the exposed portion of
the American front, and both breastwork and redoubt.
The advance of the British army was like a
solemn pageant in its steady headway, and like a
parade for
inspection in its completeness. This army, bearing knapsacks
and full campaign
equipment, moved forward as if, by the force of
its closely knit columns, it must sweep
every barrier away. But,
right in the way was a calm, intense love of liberty. It was
represented by men of the same blood and of equal
daring.
A strong contrast marked the opposing
Englishmen that summer afternoon. The plain men
handled
plain firelocks. Oxhorns held their powder, and their pockets
held their bullets.
Coatless, under the broiling sun,
unincombered, unadorned by plume or service medal, pale
and wan
after their night of toil and their day of hunger, thirst, and
waiting, this live
obstruction calmly faced the advancing
splendor.
A few hasty shots, quickly restrained, drew
an innocent fire from the British front rank.
The pale, stern men
behind the slight defence, obedient to a strong will, answered
not
to the quick volley and nothing to the audible commands of
the advancing columns -
waiting, still.
No painter can make the scene more clear
than the recital of sober deposition, and the
record left by
survivors of either side. History has no contradictions to
confuse the realities of that momentous tragedy.
The British left wing is near the
redoubt. It has only to mount a fresh earthbank, hardly
six
feet high, and its clods and sands can almost be counted - it is so
near, so easy -
so sure!
Short, crisp and earnest, low-toned, but
felt as an electric pulse are the words of
Colonel William
Prescott. Warren by his side repeats. The words fly
through the
impatient lines. The eager fingers give back
from the waiting trigger. Steadmen,
until you see the
white of the eye. Not a shot sooner. Aim at the
handsome
coats. Aim at the waistbands ?Pick off the
commanders.Wait for the word,
every man, steady.
Those plain men, so patient, can alread
count the buttons, can read the emblems on the
breastplate, can
recognize the officers and men whom they had seen parade on
Boston
Common. Features grown more distinct. The
silence is awful! The men seem dead
waiting for one
word. On the British right the light infantry gain equal
advance just as
the left wing almost touched the redoubt.
Moving over more level ground, they quickly
made the greater
distance and passed the line of those who marched directly up the
hill.
The grenadiers moved firmly upon the centre, with equal
confidence, and space lessens
to that wich the spirit of the
impending word defines. That word waits behind the
centre
and left wing, as it lingers at breastwork and redoubt. Sharp,
clear, and
deadly in ton and essence, it rings
forth, FIRE!
From redoubt to river, along the whole
sweep of the devouring flame, the forms of men wither as in a
furnace heat. The whole front goes down. For an instant
the chirp of the cricket and grasshopper in the fresh-mown hay might
almost be heard; then the groans of the wounded, then the shouts of
impatient yeomen who spring forth to pursue, until recalled to
silence, and duty. Staggering, but reviving, grand in the
glory of their manhood, heroic in restored self-possession, with
steady step in the face of fire, and over the bodies of the dead,
the British remnant renew battle. Again, a deadly volley, and
the shattered columns, in spite of entreaty, or command, speed back
to the place of landing, and the first shock of arms is
over.
A lifetime, when it is past, is but as a
moment. A moment, sometimes, is as a lifetime. Onset and
repulse. Three hundred lifetimes ended in twenty
minutes.
Putnam hastened to Bunker Hill to gather
scattering parties in the rear and urge coming rein forcements
across the isthmus, where the fire from British frigates swept with
fearful energy,but nothing could bring them in time. The men
who had toiled all night, and had just proved their valor, were
again to be tested.
The British reformed promptly, in the
perfection of their discipline. Their artillery was pushed
forward nearer the angle made by the breastwork next the redoubt,
and the whole line advanced, deployed as before, across the entire
American front. The ships of war increased their fire across
the isthmus. Charlestown had been fired and more than four
hundred houses kindled in one vast wave of smoke and flame, until a
sudden breeze swept its quivering volume away and exposed to view of
the watchful Americans the returning tide of battle. No
scattering shots in advance this time. It is only when a space
of hardly five rods is left, and a swift plunge could almost forerun
the rifle flash, that the word of execution impels the bullet, and
the entire front rank,from redoubt to river, is swept away.
Again and again, the attempt is made to rally and inspire the
paralyzed troops; but the living tide flows back, even to the
river.
Another twenty minutes - hardly twenty-five
- and the death angel has gathered his sheaves
of human hopes, as
when the Royal George went down beneath the waters with its
priceless
value of human lives.
At the first repulse the thirty-eighth
regiment took shelter by a stone fence, along the road which passes
about the base of Breed?s Hill; but at the second repulse, supported
by the fifth, it re-organized, just under the advanced crest of
Breed?s Hill for a third advance.
Stedman says: A continuous blaze of
musketry, incessant and destructive.
Gordon says: The British officers
pronounced it downright butchery to lead the men afresh
agains
those lines.
Ramsay says: Of one company not more
than five and of another not more than fourteen
-
escaped.
Lossing says: Whole platoons were lain upon
the earth, like grass by the mowers scythe.
Marshall says: The British line,
wholly broken, fell back with precipation to the
landing
place.
Frothingham quotes this statement of a
British officer: Most of our grenadiers and light
infantry,
the moment they presented themselves, lost three fourths, and many
nine-tenths
of their men. Some had only eight and nine men
to a company left, some only three, four
and five.
Botta says: A shower of bullets. The
field was covered with the slain.
Bancroft says: A continuous sheet of
fire.
Stark says: The dead lay as thick as
sheep in a fold.
It was, indeed, a strange episode in
British history, in view of the British assertion of assured
supremacy, whenever an issue challenged that supremacy.
Clinton and Burgoyne, watching from the
redoubt of Copp' Hill, realized at once the gravity of the
situation, and Clinton promptly offered his aid to rescue the
army.
Four hundred additional marines and the
forty-seventh regiment were promptly landed.
This fresh force,
under Clinton, was ordered to flank the redoubt and scale its face
to the
extreme left. General Howe, with the grenadiers and
light infantry, supported by the artillery, undertook the storming
of the breastworks, bending back from the mouth of the redoubt and,
so commanding the centre entrance.
General Pigot was ordered to rally the
remnants of the fifth, thirty-eighth, forty-third, and fifty-second
regiments, to connect the two wings, and attack the redoubt in
front.
A mere demonstration was ordered upon the
American left, while the artillery was to advance
a few rods and
then swing to its left, so as to sweep the breastwork for Howe'
advance.
The dress parade movement of the first
advance was not repeated. The commanders and the
pressure
of honored antecedents, combined to make the movement as trying as
it was moment-
ous.
The Americans were no less under a solemn
responsibility. At the previous attack, some loaded while
others fired, so that the expenditure of powder was great, almost
exhaustive. The few remaining cannon cartridges were
economically distributed. There was no longer a possibility of
reinforcements. The fire from the ships swept the
isthmus There were less than fifty bayonets to the entire
command.
During the afternoon Ward sent his own
regiment, as well as Patterson' and Gardner'
but few men reached
the actual front in time to share in the last resistance.
Gardner did,
indeed, reach Bunker Hill to aid Putnam in
establishing a second line on that summit, but
fell in the
discharge of the duty. Febiger, previously conspicuous at
Quebec, and afterward, at Stony Point, gathered a portion of
Gerrishe' regiment, and reached the redoubt in time to share in the
final struggle; but the other regiments, without their fault, were
too late.
At this time, Putnam seemed to appreciate
the full gravity of the crisis and made the most of every available
resource to concentrate a reserve for a second defence - but in
vain.
p. 301.
It was not until a pressure upon three
faces of the redoubt forced the last issue, that the defenders
poured forth one more destructive volley. A single cannon
cartridge was distributed for the final effort, and then, with
clubbed guns and the nerve of desperation, the slow retreat began,
contesting man to man and inch by inch. Warren fell, shot
through the head, in the mouth of the fort.
The battle was not quite over, even
then. Jackson rallied Gardner' men on Bunker Hill, and with
three companies of Ward's regiment and Febiger's party, so covered
the retreat as to save half of the garrison. The New Hampshire
troops of Stark and Reed, with Colt's and Chester's companies,still
held the fence line clear to the river, and covered the escape of
Prescott's command until the last cartridge had been expended, and
then their deliberate, well-ordered retreat bore testimony alike to
their virtue and valor.
Putnam made one final effort at Bunker
Hill, but in vain, and the army retired to Prospect Hill, which
Putnam had already fortified in advance.
The British did not pursue. Clinton
urged upon General Howe an immediate attack upon Cambridge; but Howe
declined the movement. The gallant Col. William Prescott
offered to retake Bunker Hill by storming if he could have three
fresh regiments; but it was not deemed best to waste further
resources
at the time.
Such, as briefly as it can be clearly
outlined, was the battle of Bunker Hill.
Nearly one third of each army was left on
the field.
The British loss was nineteen officers
killed, and seventy wounded, itself a striking evidence of the
prompt response to Prescott's orders before the action began. Of
rank and file, two hundred & seven men were killed and seven
hundred and fifty eight were wounded -Total: ten hundred and
fifty-four.
The American loss was one hundred and
forty-five killed and missing, and three hundred and four
wounded. Total, four hundred and forty-nine.
Such is the record of a battle which, in
less than two hours, destroyed a town, laid fifteen hundred men upon
the field, equalized the relations of veterans and militia, aroused
three millions of people to definite struggle for National
Independence and fairly open the war for its
accomplishment.
Washington, in his official report of the
casualties, thus specifies the loss:
Colonel Frye - 10 killed. 38
wounded & 4 missing
Colonel Little - 7 killed. 23
wounded & none missing
Colonel Brewer - 12 killed. 22 wounded
& none missing
Colonel Gridley - none killed. 4 wounded and
none missing
Colonel Stark - 15 killed. 45 wounded and none
missing
Colonel Woodbridge - none killed. 5 wounded and
none missing
Colonel Scammon - none killed. 2 wounded and none
missing
Colonel Bridge - 17 killed. 25 wounded and none
missing
Colonel Whitcomb - 5 killed. 8 wounded and two
missing
Colonel Ward - 1 killed. 6 wounded and none
missing
Colonel Gerrishe - 3 killed. 5 wounded and none
missing
Colonel Reed - 3 killed. 29 wounded and one
missing
Colonel Prescott - 43 killed. 46 wounded and none
missing
Colonel Doolittle - 6 killed. 9 wounded and none
missing.
Colonel Gardner - none killed. 7 wounded and none
missing
Colonel Patterson - none killed. 1 wounded and one
missing
Colonel Nixon - 3 killed. none wounded and none missing
Transcribed &
Submitted by Janice Farnsworth -
Source: Bay State
Monthly pub by John N. McClintock & Co. Boston Vols. 1-4,
1884-1886
Excerpts from "Bunker Hill" by Colonel
Henry B. Carrington, LL.D.
